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Abstract 
We analyze empirically whether the emergence of China as a large recipient of FDI has 
affected the amount of FDI received by Latin American countries. For the longest time span 
possible given data availability (from 1984 to 2001), we do not find a substitution from Latin 
American inward FDI to China, when other relevant factors are taken into account. However, 
concentrating on the last few years (from 1995 to 2001), when FDI boomed worldwide and 
negotiations for China’s WTO membership accelerated, the “Chinese” effect becomes highly 
significant. Assessing the impact country by country, China’s inward FDI appears to have 
hampered that of Mexico and Colombia. 
 
Keywords: China, Latin America, FDI 
JEL classification: F21, F3 
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1 Introduction 
The rapid emergence of China as an important player in the global economy is a remarkable 
issue with consequences for the rest of the world. An important aspect is foreign direct 
investment (FDI) since China has been attracting a growing share of FDI flows since 1990s. 
After receiving an average of $28 billion in the 1990s, China’s annual FDI inflows have 
increased to $47 billion on average since World Trade Organization (WTO) membership 
in 20011 (Graph 1) and have continued to grow even faster, reaching $61 billion in 2004. In a 
relatively short period of time, China has accumulated the third largest stock of inward FDI 
after the US and the UK. Foreign firms are attracted by China's rapid economic growth, 
increasing demand for consumer goods, a relatively skilled and educated workforce for the 
wages paid, improved infrastructure and a more predictable business environment. Since the 
early 1980s, China has drawn significant investment from regional conglomerates in Hong 
Kong, Taiwan, Macao and Singapore, but also from the largest industrial economies, 
particularly Japan and the US. 
 
In the same way as many countries fear China as a competitor in the export markets, 
there is a growing concern, especially in developing countries, that FDI may be diverted into 
China. FDI is very important for Latin America since it has been the major source of external 
financing in the last few years and has also helped modernize the economic structure. 
Nonetheless, FDI flows to Latin America started to fall in 2000 while FDI to China was 
accelerating (Graph 1). Given its relevance for the future of the region, deepening our 
knowledge of the determinants of inward FDI seems clearly warranted. This is what this study 
does, focusing on the impact of China as an always more important recipient of FDI. 
 
Whether external financing is diverted from Latin American countries into China will 
depend on a number of different factors. A first one is the degree of integration of capital 
markets. If capital markets are not fully integrated across countries –or, more likely, regions– 
an increase in Chinese inward FDI will not necessarily imply a reduction in FDI to another 
country or region. The large regional FDI flows in Asia may fit into this description. In fact, 
Hong Kong, Taiwan, Macao and Singapore have been the main suppliers of FDI to China 
while practically irrelevant for other parts of the world, including Latin America. 
                                                                          
1. These figures are drawn from IMF International Financial Statistics. 
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Graph 1. FDI Inflows 
Sources: Customs Administration of China, WEO database of the IMF
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A second aspect is if the global supply of FDI is constant or, more specifically, if the 
impact of China’s inward FDI on worldwide FDI flows. If supply were constant, an increase in 
FDI to China would reduce the FDI to other regions. This could be the case of Latin America 
but not necessarily since other regions could take the hit. However, the global supply of FDI 
may be elastic; in fact, if foreign direct investors reap large benefits from their presence in 
China, or there are spillovers in other countries, more savings may be converted into FDI also 
in other areas of the world. In the same vein, China’s contribution to raising the rate of return 
of FDI could twist investors’ preference towards FDI instead of other private capital flows 
(mainly portfolio or cross-border lending), particularly if their returns were hardly correlated 
with those of FDI. Moreover, China itself – with a huge saving rate – is an important source of 
FDI; outward FDI from China increased 66% per year since its accession to WTO, although it 
still remains at very low levels compared to the largest OECD countries. 
 
A third aspect is the nature of Chinese inward FDI. If oriented towards exports, it 
might reduce FDI in other countries which compete in the same export markets. This will be 
less so if FDI is oriented towards China’s domestic demand. In addition, if FDI substantially 
increases Chinese imports, it might foster FDI to other countries which are suppliers of 
Chinese imports. This will be particularly the case for exporters of commodities, which China 
is scarce of. 
 
It seems, thus, clear that the impact of Chinese inward FDI on Latin American 
countries is an empirical question. There have been very few attempts in the literature: a first 
step – even if only descriptive – is found in a recent publication by the IADB (2004). The report 
depicts the evolution of cumulative bilateral FDI flows to Latin America and to China and 
calculates a coincidence index of FDI home countries, which appears to be low. 
Chantasasawat et al. (2004) analyze empirically whether China is taking FDI away from other 
Asian and Latin American countries. They find that the level of Chinese inward FDI is positively 
related to other Asian economies’ inward FDI and that there is practically no impact on Latin 
American countries. They also conduct the same exercise on the shares of FDI where they do 
show a negative Chinese effect on the Asian and Latin American shares. 
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In our paper, we continue with the empirical approach and go beyond 
Chantasasawat et al. (2004) in a number of ways. First, we use bilateral (home-host) data and 
not aggregate one. Bilateral data describes much better investor’s behaviour, avoids a 
potential aggregation bias and limits collinearity problems. Second, we not only estimate the 
impact of Chinese inward FDI on Latin America as a whole, but also differentiate among 
countries since their productive structure and the type of FDI they attract is very different. For 
instance, Mexico and Central America have mainly received export-oriented FDI while South 
America has mainly attracted FDI into the non tradable sector (financial services and utilities), 
as well as for the extraction of natural resources. We would, therefore, expect China to have a 
negative impact of the first group of countries but not on the second. In the latter case, it 
could even turn positive as China steps up its demand for commodities. 
 
A third difference between Chantasasawat et al. (2004)’s approach and ours is that 
they assume the supply of FDI to be inelastic. This is quite a restrictive assumption for 
emerging countries, which have to compete for financing. We allow for the possibility of an 
elastic supply of FDI by introducing other capital flows as an additional regressor. In this way, 
we capture potential substitution or complementarities among flows. Fourth, we take into 
account the adjustment cost of FDI, which is known to be relevant for long-term (generally 
physical) investment, such as FDI. Fifth, we improve on the econometric technique to take 
better account of endogeneity. We us the generalized method of moments, instrumenting 
potentially endogenous variables with lags, exogenous variables and other valid instruments, 
in order to obtain unbiased and consistent estimators and as efficient as possible. Finally, we 
compare different time spans, so as to assess whether China’s impact on other countries 
inward FDI is a recent phenomenon, linked to the negotiations and final participation in 
the WTO, or began already after China announced it would open up its economy at the end 
of the 1970s. 
 
This paper is organized as follows: section 2 reviews the literature of FDI 
determinants; section 3 describes the dataset, the variables included, their sources and the 
a-priori on their relation with Latin American inward FDI; section 4 sets out our econometric 
strategy and its advantages and caveats; section 5 reviews the results; and, finally, section 6 
draws the main conclusions and policy implications. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 12 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0517 
2 Determinants of FDI 
A wealth of empirical literature has analyzed which are the main determinants of inward FDI 
and very little consensus exists, except perhaps for the size of the host country’s economy.2  
 
For a long time, the general view was that the “better” a country, in terms of its 
macroeconomic situation and institutional environment, the more easily it would attract 
FDI. For example, Albuquerque et al. (2002) find that macroeconomic stability increases FDI. 
Hines (1995) and Wei (1997) show that corruption discourages it, and the same is true for 
poor business operating conditions [Singh and Jun (1995)] or the inability to repatriate profits 
[Mody, Dasgupta and Singha (1998)]. In the same vein, a survey conducted to over 1000 
chief executives of multinational enterprises concludes that macroeconomic and political 
stability, as well as the regulatory environment and country size are keys for foreign direct 
investors to decide where to establish themselves [AT Kerney (2003)]. 
 
Haussmann (2001), however, challenged the view showing evidence that poor-
performers, in terms of lower GDP per capita and more macroeconomic stability, tend to 
attract more FDI. He also finds that countries with poorer institutions tend to attract more FDI 
as a share of total private capital flows. Another variable for which there is clearly no 
consensus is human capital. While it generally helps increase the marginal productivity of 
capital, this might not be the case in low-skill labour intensive countries where FDI is mostly 
attracted by low salaries [Chantasasawat (2003)]. 
 
As for the size of the economy, Jaumotte (2004) and Love and Lage-Hidalgo (2000), 
among others, show evidence that the host country’s total GDP and GDP per capita, 
respectively, help receiving more FDI. In addition, openness to trade also appears to be 
a relevant determinant of FDI [Singh and Jun (1995) and Albuquerque, Loayza and 
Servén (2003)]. 
 
Another strand of the literature has concentrated on the relation between 
trade and FDI [Brainard (1997) and Chen (1994)]. Some find evidence of a substitution effect 
between the two while others argue in favour of complementarities. Substitution should, in 
principle, be the result of countries exporting a certain good which decide to produce it in the 
destination country so as to avoid import or export tariffs. Complementarities could exist if FDI 
is export-oriented and requires importing inputs from the home country. 
 
Finally, some authors have concentrated on the role of push factors, either in home 
country or global ones although there is no clear consensus on which ones are key. 
Albuquerque, Loyza and Servén (2002) report that push factors explain more than 50% of FDI 
developments. In the same vein, Levy-Yeyati, Panizza and Stein (2002) show that the 
economic cycle in industrial countries is a relevant determinant of FDI but the direction of 
influences changes for the US, Japan and Europe. 
 
                                                                          
2. Reviewing the reasons behind the lack of consensus is beyond the scope of this paper but two very important ones 
are the lack of reliable data (Singh and Jun, 1995) and the difference between horizontal and vertical FDI (Ewe-Ghee Lim, 
2001). 
 BANCO DE ESPAÑA 13 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0517 
3 Variables and data issues 
Our dependent variable is composed of annual bilateral inward FDI flows from the different 
OECD home countries towards the six largest host economies of Latin America, expressed in 
millions of US dollars. These are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela 
(the full list of home and host countries is shown in Table A-1). The reason to limit our analysis 
to these six countries is that they are the only Latin American ones included in the only 
database available for bilateral FDI flows for a large number of countries, namely the OECD’s 
International Direct Investment Statistics (Table A-2 gives details on data sources). 
 
We have followed two alternatives time horizons. The longest possible one, given 
data availability, which starts close to China’s decision to conduct an “open door” policy, 
namely from 1984 until 2001. This yields an unbalanced panel of 2850 observations of 
bilateral FDI flows. Nonetheless, due to the missing values in the explanatory variables, this 
first model is estimated with a maximum of 527 observations3. Second, since the pattern 
of FDI flows appears to have changed since the mid-1990s, we estimate a shorter panel, 
from 1995 to 2001. This period should also capture foreign investors’ behaviour in the light of 
China’s negotiations for WTO membership. In this case, we only have a maximum of 428 
observations in the estimations.  
 
Our objective variable is the bilateral inward FDI flows from different OECD countries 
to China. If there were a substitution effect from Latin American inward FDI towards China, 
the sign of this coefficient would be negative. The data is drawn from the same OECD source 
as the dependent variable. This implies that our data excludes important suppliers of FDI to 
China, which find themselves in the Asian region but outside the OECD. In reality, it is hard to 
think of a potential competition between China and Latin America for FDI from Asian countries 
such as Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan or Singapore, which accounted for 44% of FDI received 
in China in 2003. The cultural and ethnical ties between China and Asian non-OECD 
countries, suggest that there is a fragmentation in the FDI market. Including these countries 
as FDI providers could actually distort the answer to the question we pose ourselves, namely 
whether global foreign direct investors have reduced their FDI in Latin America because of 
China. On the contrary, the FDI to Latin America is mainly originated in OECD countries, 
which accounted for 76% of the total received in 2002. Therefore, our work focuses on the 
FDI from OECD countries so as to guarantee a relatively high degree of integration of the FDI 
market and, thereby, real opportunities of substitution among destination countries.  
 
We also construct another objective variable, as a robustness test, which reflects 
bilateral inward FDI to Hong Kong. This is because a lot of reinvesting takes place between 
the two economies and is not adequately accounted for in the statistics. This phenomenon, 
which is generally known as roundtripping, starts with China’s exporting capital to Hong 
Kong, favoured by tax advantages. This capital, then, returns to China in the form of FDI. 
 
The other potentially relevant determinants of FDI, which we include as control 
variables, are classified into: (i) capital flows, (ii) bilateral variables, (iii) host country factors, 
(iv) home country variables and (v) global factors. 
                                                                          
3. This is the number of observations in the restricted model (after eliminating jointly non-significant parameters). In the 
general model the number of observations is lower, 339, because of the existence of missing values in the non-
significant regressors.  
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The model estimated could be expressed as follows: 
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i= host country (Latin America) 
j= home country (OECD)  
 
As for capital flows, we include a number of different controls. First, we consider 
developments in other capital flows (namely portfolio and cross-border) so as to account for 
the potential substitution between different types of investment. If such substitution existed, 
the coefficient would have to be negative and significant. This data are drawn from the IMF 
International Financial Statistics (IFS). Second, we allow for the possible persistence of FDI 
flows since investment requires time to adjust to desired levels. We do so by taking the lag 
of the dependent variable. A third regressor considers the behaviour of other exporters of FDI, 
so as to determine whether investment decisions are influenced by what competitors do. 
To take this into account, we include FDI from the whole OECD to Latin America, as well 
as to China and Hong Kong. A positive and significant coefficient would indicate some kind of 
herd behaviour among foreign direct investors or “follow your competitor”. Fourth, we also 
consider the possibility that FDI decisions may be taken at a regional level. In other words, if 
a country invests in, say, Chile, it could encourage additional investment in other Latin 
American countries. Fifth, we introduce FDI to OECD countries to test whether a possible 
preference of foreign direct investors to be present only in industrial countries discourages FDI 
to Latin America. Finally, we control for global trends in FDI flows. This is because it will 
certainly be easier for Latin American countries to receive investment boom years for FDI. All 
these variables are drawn from the above-mentioned OECD database. 
 
As bilateral factors, we include the bilateral nominal exchange rate because it affects 
the cost of the investment – if paid in local currency – but also the value of repatriated profits. 
A depreciation of the host country currency against the home country one reduces the cost of 
the investment but also profits repatriated, so that there is no clear a-priori on the expected 
sign of the coefficient. The data is drawn from the IFS and an increase implies a depreciation 
of the host currency against the home one. We add a measure of the relative investment cost, 
measured by the difference in the short-term interest rate between the host and the home 
country, and which is also drawn from the IFS. The coefficient of this variable should, in 
principle, be negative but only if the investment is financed locally; otherwise it would be the 
home interest rate or an international one to matter. In addition, we take bilateral exports and 
imports from the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics. This allows us to control for the potential 
sustituibility or complementarity between exports/imports and inward FDI, as described in the 
previous section. Finally, we include an index of the similarity in the production structure 
between the home and the host countries, based on two-digit manufactured value added 
data from United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO).4 This variable should 
                                                                          
4. The construction of this measure of economic similarity follows García -Herrero and Ruiz (2004). It is expressed as  
, , , , , ,
1
N
j i t n j t n i t
n
S s s
=
= − −∑  
 
where N is the number of sectors. Note that
, ,i j tS  represents the average of discrepancies in economic structures in the 
period t. 
, ,i j tS  might take values between 0 for identical structures and –2 for disjoint productive structures. Therefore 
higher values for 
, ,i j tS  imply more similarity between the host and home productive structure. 
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indicate how similar their economies are and to what extent the may compete in third 
markets. 
 
Finally, other potentially relevant host factors. Macroeconomic conditions related to 
the external sector, such as the level of external debt to GDP, the debt service, international 
reserves and export growth are included. Although no strong consensus exists in the 
empirical literature as to their influence, the first two should, in principle, bear a negative 
relation with inward FDI while the last two, particularly the latter, should be positively related. 
Other host macroeconomic conditions are GDP growth, the level of domestic investment 
to GDP, and the fiscal balance, whose coefficients should, in principle, be positive. Inflation 
and the real exchange rate may be expected to reduce inward FDI in as far as they lower the 
host country’s competitiveness. All these variables are drawn from the IFS and the World 
Bank World Development Indicators (WDI). Finally, the size of the economy should, in 
principle, foster FDI. We proxy it by a combination of GDP per capita and GDP5, both in US 
dollar. The two are drawn from the WDI and the IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO) 
database, respectively. We also include a country’s endowment of natural resources, 
drawn from Haussmann (2001). Finally, due to the restrictions imposed by the methodology 
used – only time variant variables can be considered – only a few host country institutional 
characteristics are included, namely capital account restrictions, drawn from Lane and 
Milesi-Ferretti (2004), the quality of creditor rights from the International Country Risk Guide 
database, and human capital, proxied by the literacy level from the WDI database. The first 
should discourage capital flows, including FDI, and the last two should, in principle, yield a 
positive effect. However, as for macroeconomic variables, we should not forget the general 
lack of a strong consensus in the literature. 
 
Finally, other potentially relevant host country factors are financial crises. We include 
one dummy variable for each type of crisis, sovereign, currency or banking, which take the 
value of one in each year in which a country finds itself in a crisis. This allows us to capture 
the cumulative impact of each of these events.6 The information is drawn from Díaz-Cassou, 
García-Herrero and Molina (2004). While we should generally expect crises to discourage 
foreign investors, it is also true that banking crises tend to be followed by the opening up of 
the banking system to foreign competition, mainly through privatization. This could attract 
FDI. 
 
As for home county effects, we include GDP growth and GDP per capita, from 
the WEO database. Finally, we take developments in oil prices as the main global factor 
affecting FDI. These are drawn from Datastream. Table A-3 shows bilateral correlation 
between all these regressors.  
                                                                          
5. We also control for both variables separately and the results do not change. 
6. To test the robustness of the results, we construct a different dummy, which only takes the value of one in the first 
year of the crisis. 
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4 Empirical methodology 
Given the paper’s objective, determining in the most accurate way whether China’s inward 
FDI affects Latin America’s one, we face one major challenge: endogeneity. Endogeneity 
could lead to a biased coefficient of our objective variable (Chinese inward FDI). Other 
potential problems are how to deal with the adjustment costs of FDI, unobserved 
heterogeneity and the choice of the control variables not to lose too many degrees of freedom 
while avoid a missing variable problem. To tackle potential endogeneity, but also the 
existence of adjustment costs and unobserved heterogeneity, we use the Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM), following Arellano and Bover (1995). 
 
The Arellano-Bover estimator – also called system GMM estimator – combines the 
regression expressed in first differences (lagged values of the variables in levels are used as 
instruments) with the original equation expressed in levels (this equation is instrumented with 
lagged differences of the variables) and allows to include some additional instruments. 
 
We prefer this option to a fixed-effects estimator for several reasons. First, it allows 
us to take into account unobserved time-invariant bilateral specific effects. Second, we can 
tackle the potential endogeneity arising from the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable 
(to capture the adjustment costs) and other potentially endogenous variables in the right-hand 
side of the equation, such as bilateral FDI to Latin America, other FDI flows and bilateral 
trade.7 Third, it deals with the possibility that the dependent variable is not stationary. Finally, 
we achieve a high degree of efficiency by considering all possible instruments. 
 
However, there are two main disadvantages with the GMM estimators. First, 
because their properties hold asymptotically, it would be safer to use this methodology with 
a very large number of observations.8 As robustness test, we run all regressions as a 
fixed-effect panel with robust standard errors. The results do not differ too much. The other 
disadvantage is that we cannot include time-invariant regressors since their coefficients are 
not identifiable with this methodology. This does not imply however that there is a problem of 
omitted variables since they are all included in the time-invariant country-specific effects. 
 
We also tackle any potential omitted variable problem in an additional way. We, first 
estimate a general equation including all control variables considered [column (1) of Tables 1 
and 2]. We, then, test – through a Wald test – the joint hypothesis that the coefficients of the 
variables that are not significant individually are equal to zero. If not rejected, we re-estimate 
the model only with the controls which were significant in the general regression. Otherwise, 
we test a less restrictive hypothesis but still trying to reduce the number of regressors to the 
maximum extent possible. This is a sequential – from general to specific9 – strategy, which we 
follow until we reject that the remaining set of coefficients of the control variables is equal to 
zero [Column (2) of Tables 1 and 2]. In this way, we achieve more efficient coefficients of the 
remaining parameters, including that of the variable of interest, Chinese inward FDI. The last 
model, apart from incorporating these restrictions on the regressors included, tests whether 
the effect of Chinese inward FDI is different across Latin American countries [Column (3) of 
Tables 1 and 2]. 
                                                                          
7. As a robustness test we also instrumented for the bilateral nominal exchange rate. The results do not change. 
8. In any event, the small sample problem is less acute for the Arellano-Bover estimator than the Arellano-Bond one, 
since it has been shown to provide more accurate estimations in small samples (Bond, 2002). Additionally, this estimator 
does not require time stationarity as long as T is small, which seems to be our case.  
9. See Hendry (2000) for details on the general to specific strategy. 
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5 Results 
As previously described, we regress the six largest Latin American countries’ inward FDI on 
bilateral FDI to China and control for the all aforementioned regressors in the unrestricted 
model. 
 
As a first step, we use our whole sample from 1984 to 2001. This captures 
developments shortly after China started its open door policy until the most recent data, 
namely China’s entry into WTO. When all controls are introduced, we find no evidence of a 
substitution effect from Latin American FDI to China (Table 1, column 1). The same is true 
for FDI to Hong Kong. When, then, proceed to reducing the number of control variables and 
the lack of a significant impact of Chinese inward FDI is confirmed (Table 1, column 2). 
 
We also look into the impact of China on the inward FDI of each of the Latin 
American countries considered. Argentina and Colombia are negatively affected at a 5% 
and 10% significance level, respectively, but the parameters are very small (Table 1, 
column 3). In addition, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the coefficients of each Latin 
American country are the same and equal to zero. Given the weakness of these two results, 
we can generally conclude that there is virtually no “Chinese effect” on Latin American 
inward FDI in this long time span. 
 
To report on the significance of the control variables, we concentrate on the 
restricted model since the estimators are more efficient.10 First, we find a strong and 
significant complementarity effect between FDI and other private capital flows since the 
coefficient for total capital flows over GDP is positive and highly significance. This result 
supports the hypothesis of an elastic supply of FDI. Second, there is a certain degree of 
“regional behaviour” of investors, since an increase in FDI to a certain Latin American country 
from a given home raises investment in other countries of the region. This is shown in the 
highly significant, albeit small, coefficient of bilateral FDI to Latin America. Third, the amount of 
bilateral exports also appears to foster FDI, which supports the hypothesis of a 
complementarity – and not substitution – between the two. One possible interpretation is that 
the FDI received by Latin American countries is export oriented, at least in certain countries, 
and, therefore, fosters exports. Fourth, as one would expect, the availability of natural 
resources in the host countries contributes to higher inward FDI. Finally, and interestingly, the 
occurrence of banking crises appears to foster FDI in all three specifications. This causal link 
is probably not so much the banking crisis itself but rather the privatization and opening-up to 
foreign competition which have followed these crises in virtually all Latin American countries in 
our sample.11 Finally, it should be noted that the fixed effects estimated for each home-host 
pair are also picking up the information of the regressors which barely change over time. This 
could explain why they are not found significant. 
 
In a second exercise, we restrict the panel to a more recent time span, from 1995 
to 2001. There are a number of reasons to choose this shorter time span. First, there may 
have been a structural change in the evolution of FDI since the mid-1990s. Second, China 
accelerated its negotiations for WTO membership in this period, until it finally entered the club 
                                                                          
10. The bilateral nominal exchange rate, the debt service and GDP growth in the host country are only significant in the 
first specification with all regressors. The non-significance in the restricted model may be due to the increased number of 
observations and degrees of freedom. 
11. The fact that this result is only found for the dummy which considers all crisis years, and not only the burst of the 
crisis, supports this interpretation. 
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in 2001. An additional, more technical, reason is that the potential problem of non-stationarity 
(although considered in the Arellano-Bover methodology) is clearly reduced for this shorter 
time span. 
 
In this period, there is a clearly negative and significant effect of Chinese inward FDI 
on that to Latin America (Table 2, column 1 and 2). When analyzing the impact country by 
country, Mexico and Colombia are negatively affected by a reduction in Chinese inward FDI 
in a significant way, particularly in the case of Mexico at a 99% confidence level (95% for 
Colombia). As Table 2 shows, when Chinese inward FDI increases by $100 million, 
Colombian and Mexican inward FDI is reduced by $84 and $29 million, respectively. 
Notwithstanding the relatively large difference in the parameters, the impact could be similar 
since we cannot reject the hypothesis that both coefficients are statistically equal. This result 
is particularly interesting in the case of Mexico since its free trade agreement with the US 
(NAFTA) was in place during the whole time span and inward FDI generally increased. In fact, 
it only started to fall more recently, in 2002, but this does not imply that China had no effect. 
Our results should be read in terms of a counterfactual: Had Chinese inward FDI not been so 
strong, Mexico could have attracted more FDI than it actually did. Finally, if we exclude the 
impact on Mexico and Colombia, no dislocation can be found from the other Latin America 
countries to China.12 
 
Results for control variables are very similar to the longer panel except for two. The 
bilateral nominal exchange depreciation is now clearly significant in increasing FDI to Latin 
American countries, which hints to the fact that a lower investment cost, because of the 
exchange rate depreciation, weighs more than a reduction in repatriated benefits. In addition, 
larger bilateral imports seem to imply less Latin American inward FDI. This result is in line with 
the hypothesis of substitution between imports and FDI and hints to the existence of a large 
share of FDI geared towards domestic demand for Latin American countries as a group. If 
consider this result together with the previously found complementary of exports, it could well 
be that the complementary of exports stems from those countries which receive more export-
oriented FDI, such as Mexico, and the substitutability of imports from some of the South 
American countries. In any event, this hypothesis cannot be tested since we only have Latin 
American aggregate coefficients for the control variables 
 
Finally, we conduct a number of robustness tests, which do not change our 
results.13 The first one tackles the close relation between Hong Kong’s and Chinese inward 
FDI. We, thus, take as objective variable the sum of FDI to China and Hong Kong. Second, 
we test the extreme hypothesis of complete substitution from Latin American inward FDI to 
that of China. As could be expected, from our results, the hypothesis is rejected. Third, we 
run the regressions taking logs for all variables for which this is possible. Fourth, we account 
for the potential endogeneity of the bilateral exchange rate by taking instruments. Fifth and 
last, we control for the potential endogeneity of the externality associated to total FDI to Latin 
America excluding the FDI of the host country in point. 
                                                                          
12. In other words, we can not reject that coefficients of Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Venezuela are the same and 
equal to 0.  
13. The results of these tests are available by request. 
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Table 1. Results for long time span. Sample 1984-2001 
 
Dependent variable: Bilateral FDI flow from 
home to host
Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value
Objective variables
Latin America as whole
Bilateral FDI to China -0.068 (0.234) -0.062 (0.245)
Bilateral FDI to Hong Kong -0.033 (0.574)
Country specific (b)
Impact on FDI to China on FDI to Argentina -0.095** (0.043)
Impact on FDI to China on FDI to Brazil -0.131 (0.383)
Impact on FDI to China on FDI to Chile 0.075 (0.489)
Impact on FDI to China on FDI to Colombia -0.228* (0.091)
Impact on FDI to China on FDI to Mexico -0.068 (0.295)
Impact on FDI to China on FDI to Venezuela -0.062 (0.487)
Control variables
Capital flows
Total capital flows over GDP -16.535 (0.163) 9.357*** (0.002) 8.775*** (0.002)
Lag of Bilateral FDI 0.259 (0.258) 0.221 (0.172) 0.312 (0.140)
OECD FDI to China 0.003 (0.329)
OECD FDI to Hong Kong 0.006 (0.398)
OECD FDI to Latin America -0.001 (0.308)
Total FDI of OECD countries 0.000 (0.448)
Bilateral FDI to Latin America 0.061*** (0.002) 0.060*** (0.004) 0.051*** (0.003)
Bilateral FDI to OECD 0.002 (0.156) 0.001 (0.149) 0.001 (0.118)
Bilateral variables
Bilateral nominal exchange rate 
(increase indicates depreciation of host)
0.398** (0.018) 0.082 (0.134) 0.099* (0.067)
Host home interest rate differential 0.164 (0.414)
Exports 0.074** (0.012) 0.038*** (0.007) 0.037*** (0.007)
Imports -0.029 (0.409)
Similarity in productive structure 36.881 (0.808) 94.095 (0.258) 91.405 (0.256)
Host country variables
    Macro variables
External Debt to GDP -4.335 (0.571)
Debt service to GDP -95.210** (0.018)
External Reserves -0.012 (0.280)
Export growth -1.772 (0.620)
GDP growth 40.084** (0.024) 7.707 (0.162) 6.507 (0.205)
Inflation -0.592 (0.225)
Fiscal balance -17.023 (0.384)
Domestic Investment over GDP -18.733 (0.199)
Real Effective Exchange Rate
(increase indicates an appreciation)
-0.831 (0.495)
    General characteristics
Size 0.000 (0.540)
Natural Resources 1.045** (0.043) 0.221** (0.049) 0.216* (0.055)
   Institutional characteristics
Capital account restrictions 166.729 (0.372)
Creditor rights 32.538 (0.583)
Literacy 81.430 (0.243) 15.644 (0.150) 13.752 (0.149)
   Occurrence of Crises 
Sovereign crisis -94.170 (0.448)
Banking crisis 459.129*** (0.007) 147.731*** (0.009) 135.266** (0.010)
Currency crisis -157.281 (0.232)
Home country variables
GDP growth in home country -31.985 (0.138) -4.837 (0.219) -3.288 (0.334)
GDP per capita in home country 0.000 (0.957)
Global shocks
Oil price 6.699 (0.701)
Constant -7153.329 (0.246) -1707.054 (0.114) -1520.144 (0.112)
F-statistic 42678.81 (0.000) 497.36 (0.000) 1430.84 (0.000)
Observations 339 527 527
Number of groups (home host) 65 87 87
Sample 1984-2001
Robust p values in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Variables in italics are instrumented through the GMM procedure following Arellano and Bover (1995)
(a) Although control variables' coefficients differ numerically with column (2), qualitatively, the results are the same.
(1) (2) (3)
Variables removed in columns (2) and (3) are jointly not significant at a 95% confidence interval. 
The categorical variables rating  and civil and political liberties are also included as regressors 
(b) These variables result from multiplying FDI to China and a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 for the observations of each of the 
host countries. 
Common effect for all 
Latin America countries
(1) + Jointly non-
significant coefficients 
removed
(2) +  Individual effect 
for each Latin America 
country (a)
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Table 2. Results for shorter time span. Sample 1995-2001 
 
Dependent variable: Bilateral FDI flow from 
home to host
Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value
Objective variables
Latin America as whole
Bilateral FDI to China -0.154* (0.065) -0.157** (0.024)
Bilateral FDI to Hong Kong -0.084 (0.299)
Country specific (b) 
Impact on FDI to China on FDI to Argentina -0.083 (0.244)
Impact on FDI to China on FDI to Brazil -0.219 (0.260)
Impact on FDI to China on FDI to Chile 0.035 (0.737)
Impact on FDI to China on FDI to Colombia -0.844** (0.013)
Impact on FDI to China on FDI to Mexico -0.287*** (0.007)
Impact on FDI to China on FDI to Venezuela -0.204 (0.230)
Control variables
Capital flows
Total capital flows over GDP 42.349** (0.034) 9.168 (0.193) 7.464 (0.296)
Lag of Bilateral FDI 0.031 (0.877) 0.046 (0.259) 0.064* (0.055)
OECD FDI to China -0.002 (0.430)
OECD FDI to Hong Kong 0.023** (0.018)
OECD FDI to Latin America -0.004** (0.013)
Total FDI of OECD countries 0.000 (0.379)
Bilateral FDI to Latin America 0.086*** (0.004) 0.121*** (0.001) 0.108*** (0.001)
Bilateral FDI to OECD 0.001 (0.177)
Bilateral variables
Bilateral nominal exchange rate 
(increase indicates depreciation of host)
0.621** (0.020) 0.179** (0.045) 0.276*** (0.008)
Host home interest rate differential -3.149 (0.158)
Exports 0.203*** (0.001) 0.247*** (0.000) 0.250*** (0.002)
Imports -0.121** (0.033) -0.168*** (0.003) -0.167** (0.011)
Similarity in productive structure 97.138 (0.682)
Host country variables
    Macro variables
External Debt to GDP -3.307 (0.667)
Debt service to GDP 122.735** (0.043)
External Reserves -0.019 (0.130) -0.007 (0.151) -0.005 (0.250)
Export growth 5.459 (0.374)
GDP growth -33.646 (0.260)
Inflation 8.161 (0.165)
Fiscal balance -94.879 (0.170)
Domestic Investment over GDP 29.968 (0.507)
Real Effective Exchange Rate
(increase indicates an appreciation)
-1.911 (0.530)
    General characteristics
Size 0.000 (0.450)
Natural Resources 1.702** (0.044) 0.677** (0.022) 0.621** (0.032)
   Institutional characteristics
Capital account restrictions
Creditor rights 47.222 (0.410)
Literacy 193.501** (0.026) 46.056* (0.085) 35.217 (0.189)
   Occurrence of Crises 
Sovereign crisis -195.527 (0.347)
Banking crisis -398.843 (0.128) 222.233*** (0.000) 217.170*** (0.001)
Currency crisis 53.805 (0.773)
Home country variables
GDP growth in home country -7.787 (0.702)
GDP per capita in home country 0.007 (0.260)
Constant -20930.168 (0.026) -4928.704 (0.062) -3882.54 (0.138)
F-statistic 6425.51 (0.000) 338.92 (0.000) 291.51 (0.000)
Observations 172 428 428
Number of group (home host) 60 99 99
Sample 1995-2001
Robust p values in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Variables in italics are instrumented through the GMM procedure following Arellano and Bover (1995)
(a) Although control variables' coefficients differ numerically with column (2), qualitatively, the results are the same.
Variables removed in columns (2) and (3) are jointly not significant at a 95% confidence interval. 
(b) These variables result from multiplying FDI to China and a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 for the observations of each of the 
host countries. 
Common effect for all 
Latin America countries
(1) + Jointly non-
significant coefficients 
removed
(2) +  Individual effect 
for each Latin America 
country (a)
(1) (2) (3)
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6 Conclusions 
In this paper we investigate how Chinese inward FDI affects FDI flows to Latin American 
countries. Over a long time span, from 1984 to 2001, we hardly find any evidence of FDI 
dislocation from Latin American countries to China but it seems to be present in a more 
recent time span, which focus on the years when FDI flows grew more rapidly worldwide and 
negotiations for China’s WTO membership accelerated (namely, from 1995 to 2001). This is 
due to the significant in the case of Mexico’s and Colombia’s negative impact while the rest of 
Latin America countries are not affected. Given that FDI generally increased during the period 
considered, these results should be read in terms of the counterfactual: Had Chinese inward 
FDI not been so strong, these countries could have attracted more FDI. 
 
This would suggest that competing in the same sectors as China increases the 
likelihood of a substitution of FDI. Having a cursory look a the sector structure of FDI in 
Mexico and Colombia, we find that manufacturing accounts for 56% of total in the case of 
Mexico (the largest of all sectors) and 21% in the case of Colombia (the largest after financial 
services). By contrast, Brazil has a much smaller share of FDI in manufacturing (about 10%) 
while most of it concentrates on telecommunications and financial services.14 In any event, 
this interpretation of the results should be taken with care since we do not have enough 
evidence that this is the main channel through which China affects Latin American FDI. In fact, 
since the focus of our paper was the behaviour of global investors, we have opted for bilateral 
rather than sectoral data so that not much can be said about the channels in which China 
may influence other host countries. Both bilateral and sectoral data would be ideal but they 
are not available. 
 
When looking into the future, there are reasons to expect that China will continue to 
receive large amounts of FDI, and perhaps even increase them: the country is bound to 
embark in a large privatization process, which has already been announced for some sectors. 
In addition, the wage differential with Latin American countries will probably be maintained for 
quite some time given China’s large – for some close to infinite – elasticity of labour supply. 
Finally, even if wages increase substantially, they will be along with purchasing power for a 
very large population. This will make China a particularly attractive country for FDI targeting 
domestic demand. 
 
This scenario, where China continues to attract a large share of world FDI, may 
seem worrisome for Latin American countries, particularly those with a more similar 
productive structure to that of China. However, it only reflects one side of the coin. At the 
same time, it provides tremendous opportunities in the medium term. Due to geographical 
reasons, Latin American countries are not in such good position as Asian economies to reap 
some of these benefits, such as assembling and re-exporting of manufactured products. 
However, they will clearly benefit from China’s increasing demand for raw materials in a 
scenario where China continues to grow fast. This is not only true for Latin American exports 
but also for inward FDI in sectors related to raw materials. Interestingly, potential investors in 
the region are not only the global players included in our database, basically OECD countries, 
but also China itself, which will want to ensure its access to raw material. This is why the 
                                                                          
14. This has been estimated using FDI flows from the three main investors to Brazil, namely the US, Spain and Japan. 
Unfortunately, we cannot compare Mexico and Colombia with the other Latin American countries included in our 
analysis since we could not find sectoral information.  
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further opening of these sectors to foreign investors is a pre-condition for Latin American 
countries to reap these benefits of China’s increasing global presence. 
 BANCO DE ESPAÑA 23 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0517 
REFERENCES 
ALBUQUERQUE, R., LOAYZA and SERVÉN (2003). World Market Integration through the Lens of Foreign Direct 
Investors, Policy Research Working Paper Series 3060, The World Bank. 
ARELLANO, M., and O. BOVER (1995). “Another Look at the Instrumental-Variable Estimation of Error-Components 
Models”, Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 68, pp. 29-52 
AT KERNEY (2003). FDI Confidence Index Reports, 1997-2002. 
BLUNDELL, R., and BOND (1998). “Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data models”, Journal of 
Econometrics, 87, pp. 115-143. 
BOND, S. (2002). Dynamic panel data models: A guide to micro data methods and practice. Working Paper 09/02, 
Institute for Fiscal Studies, London. 
BRAINARD, L. (1997). “An Empirical Assessment of the Proximity-Concentration Trade-off Between Multinational Sales 
and Trade”, American Economic Review, 87 (4), pp. 520-544. 
CAPRIO, G,. and KLINGEBIEL (2003). Episodes of systemic and borderline financial crises, Dataset mimeo, The World 
Bank. 
CHANTASASAWAT, B., FUNG, IIZAKA and SIU (2003). “International Competition for Foreign Direct Investment: The 
Case of China”, Paper to be presented at the Hitotsubashi Conference on International Trade and FDI. 
––  (2004). Foreign Direct Investment in East Asia and Latin America: Is there a People’s Republic of China Effect? ADB 
Institute Discussion Paper N.º 17. 
CHEN, E. (1994). Foreign Direct Investment and Trade as a Vehicle for Rapid Economic Growth: The NIE Experience. 
Working Paper presented in Colombo, Sri Lanka, Feb. 
DÍAZ-CASSOU, J, A. GARCÍA-HERRERO and J. L. MOLINA, (2004). The IMF Catalytic Role In Crisis Resolution And 
Crisis Prevention, mimeo. 
EWE-GHEE L. (2001). Determinants of, and the Relation Between, Foreign Direct Investment and Growth: A Summary of 
the Recent Literature, IMF Working Paper WP/01/175. 
FUNG, K.C., IIZAKA and PARKER (2002). “Determinants of US and Japanese Foreign Direct Investment in China”, 
Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 30. 
GARCÍA-HERRERO, A., and RUIZ, (2004), How Much do Trade and Financial Linkages Matter for Business Cycle 
Synchronization?, mimeo. 
GREENE, W. H. (2002). Econometric Analysis, 5th ed. Prentice-Hall. 
HAUSSMANN, R. (2001). “Foreign Direct Investment: Good Cholesterol?” Paper prepared for the Annual Meetings of the 
IADB and IAIC. 
HENDRY, D. F. (2000). Econometric Modelling, Oxford University. 
HINES, J. R. (1995). Forbidden Payment: Foreign Bribery and American Business After 1977, NBER Working 
Paper 5266. 
INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK (IADB) (2004). “The Emergence of China: Opportunities And Challenges For 
Latin America And The Caribbean”, Draft for discussion at the Conference, October 1, 2004. 
JAUMOTTE, F. (2004). Foreign Direct Investment and Regional Trade Agreements: The Market Size Effect Revisited, 
Working Paper N.º 04/206, IMF. 
LANE, P. R., G. M. MILESI-FERRETTI (2004). Financial Globalization and Exchange Rates, mimeo IMF. 
LEVY-YEYATI, E., PANIZZA and STEIN, (2002). “The Cyclical Nature of North-South FDI Flows”, presented at the Joint 
Conference of IADB-WB, The DFI Race: Who Gets the Prize? Is it Worth the Effort? 
LOVE, J. H., and LAGE-HIDALGO (2000). “Analysing the Determinants of US Direct Investment in Mexico”, Applied 
Economics, 32, pp. 1259-1267. 
LUCAS, R. (1993). “On the Determinants of Direct Foreign Investment: Evidence from East and Southeast Asia”, World 
Development, 21 (3), pp. 391-406. 
MODY, A., DASGUPTA and SINHA, (1998). “Japanese Multinationals in Asia: Drivers and Attractors”, Oxford 
Development Studies, Vol. 27, N.º 2, pp. 149-164. 
MOORE, M. O. (1993). “Determinants of German Manufacturing Direct Investment: 1980-1988”, Weltwirtschaftsliches 
Archiv, 129, pp. 120-137. 
SINGH, H., and JUN (1995). Some New Evidence on Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment in Developing 
Countries, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Nº 2338. 
WEI, S. (1997). Why is Corruption So Much More Taxing Than Taxes? Arbitrariness Kills, National Bureau of Economic 
Research Working Paper 6255. 
 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 24 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0517 
Appendix: List of Tables 
Table A - 1. List of countries considered 
Home country Host country 
Additional 
countries or 
areas 
Australia Argentina China  
Austria Brazil Hong Kong 
Belgium Chile Latin America 
Canada Colombia OECD 
Czech Republic Mexico World 
Denmark Venezuela   
Finland     
France     
Germany     
Greece     
Hungary     
Iceland     
Ireland     
Italy     
Japan     
Korea     
Mexico     
Netherlands     
New Zealand     
Norway     
Poland     
Portugal     
Slovak Republic     
Spain     
Sweden     
Switzerland     
Turkey     
United Kingdom     
United States     
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Table A - 2. Variables and data sources 
Variable 
type
Name Description Units Source
Bilateral FDI Bilateral FDI Millions of USD OECD
Bilateral Bilateral exchange rate
Bilateral exchange rate. Increase implies depreciation in 
home currency
Host per home currency IFS, IMF
Bilateral Bilateral exports Bilateral Export flows Millions of USD
Direction of Trade 
Statistics, IMF
Bilateral Bilateral imports Bilateral Import flows Millions of USD
Direction of Trade 
Statistics, IMF
Bilateral
Host home interest rate 
differential
Host home differential in short term interest rates Percentage IFS, IMF
Bilateral
Similarity in productive 
structure
Index UNIDO
Capital flows Bilateral FDI to China Level of FDI flows of each home country in China Millions of USD OECD
Capital flows
Bilateral FDI to Hong 
Kong
Level of FDI flows of each home country in Hong Kong Millions of USD OECD
Capital flows
Bilateral FDI to Latin 
America
Level of FDI flows of each home country in the six Latin 
American countries included
Millions of USD OECD
Capital flows Bilateral FDI to OECD Level of FDI flows of each home country in OECD Millions of USD OECD
Capital flows OECD FDI into OECD FDI of all OECD's countries in OECD area Millions of USD OECD
Capital flows OECD FDI to China Level of FDI of all OECD's countries in China Millions of USD OECD
Capital flows OECD FDI to Hong Kong FDI of all OECD's countries in Hong Kong Millions of USD OECD
Capital flows
OECD FDI to Latin 
America
Level of FDI of all OECD's countries in Latin America Millions of USD OECD
Capital flows
Total FDI of OECD 
countries
FDI of all OECD's countries in the world Millions of USD OECD
Global Oil Price Brent Crude Current Month, fob USD/BBL Datastream
Home
GDP growth in home 
country
Gross domestic product at constant prices Percentage WEO, IMF
Home
GDP per capita in home 
country
Gross domestic product per capita, current prices US dollars WEO, IMF
Host
Capital account 
restrictions
Dummy: 1 if the country had capital account restrictions. 
0 Otherwise
Milesi-Ferretti (1998)
Host Creditor rights Contract Viability, Profits Repatriation, Payment Delays PRS Group
Host Debt service to GDP Interest expenditures plus amortizations Percentage of GDP World Bank
Host
Domestic Investment over 
GDP
Fixed capital investment Percentage of GDP World Bank
Host Export growth Annual growth in exports in USD Percentage World Bank
Host External Debt to GDP Total external debt Percentage of GDP World Bank
Host External Reserves Total reserves minus gold Millions USD IFS, IMF
Host Fiscal balance
Public sector balance (positive indicates surplus and 
negative deficit)
Percentage of GDP IFS, IMF
Host GDP growth Real GDP annual growth rate Percentage IFS, IMF
Host Inflation CPI annual growth rate Percentage IFS, IMF
Host Literacy Adult Literacy raten (% of people older than fifteen) Percentage World Bank
Host Natural Resources Natural resources valuation Millions of USD (PPP) Haussmann (2001)
Host
Occurrence of banking 
crisis
Dummy. 1 if the country has undergone a banking crisis 
in a certain year.
Diaz, García-Herrero 
and Molina (2004)
Host
Occurrence of exchange 
crisis
Dummy. 1 if the country has undergone a currency crisis 
in a certain year.
Diaz, García-Herrero 
and Molina (2004)
Host
Occurrence of sovereign 
crisis
Dummy. 1 if the country has been under default in that 
year.
Diaz, García-Herrero 
and Molina (2004)
Host
Other capital flows over 
GDP
Portofolio and other foreign investment flows Percentage of GDP IFS, IMF
Host
Political and social 
liberties
Political and social freedom. 0 more freedom Categorical Freedom House
Host Rating Sovereign debt risk rating Categorical Moody's
Host
Real Effective Exchange 
Rate
Real Effective Exchange Rates (an increase indicates an 
appreciation)
Index IFS, IMF
Host Short term Interest rate Percentage IFS, IMF
Host Size Product of GDP per capita and total GDP WEO, IMF  
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